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1 | INTRODUCTION
The current system for drug innovation and usage has gen-
erally failed public health. Only 11 (1%) of 1032 new
drugs approved in France between 2005 and 2014 were
considered real advances, and 54 of the 87 analysed drugs
or indications in 2014 were no better or actually worse
than existing treatment options.1 Drug harms are so preva-
lent that studies in high-income countries have shown that
drugs are the third leading cause of death, after heart
disease and cancer.2-11
The European Commission has estimated that adverse
reactions kill about 200 000 EU citizens annually at a cost
of €79 billion.11 Many of these deaths are avoidable. Our
for-profit system encourages overprescribing, and many
patients could have fared well without the drug that killed
them, for example a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agent
or a psychoactive drug.2,12 Meanwhile, many important
health problems do not receive the attention they deserve,
for example to address antimicrobial resistance.
The main problem is that the current system is based on
patents and monopolies, which allow companies to set their
price as they want. This system is unethical, as people may
die if they cannot get access to the drug they need. It is also
inefficient, as research knowledge is not shared, for example
about toxicology and failed projects. Furthermore, the
TRIPS-plus provisions prohibit generic manufacturers from
using clinical trial data submitted by brand manufacturers.13
I propose a radically different approach in which the
current drive of profit maximization via patents is replaced
by a public interest-driven system that is not for profit. I
hope this paper can be a starting point for a much-needed
discussion.
2 | COUNTERING MYTHS ABOUT
PATENTS AND EFFECTIVE
MEDICAL INNOVATION
Patents are ill-suited to stimulate needed and effective inno-
vation in health care. They stifle innovation because
researchers cannot share their ideas freely, and the system
encourages large-scale waste.13 Indeed, it seems that stron-
ger patent protection has led to a reduction in innovation.13
As patents expire, drug companies often file court cases
against competitors to prevent them from launching cheap
generics. The European Commission estimated in 2008 that
these legal tactics had cost the EU €3 billion in just
8 years.14
The drug industry spends only 1%-2% of gross rev-
enues, net of taxpayer subsidies, on basic research to dis-
cover new molecules.15 Most of the basic knowledge to
develop treatment advances comes from publicly funded
laboratories and institutions.16-18 In its drive to maximize
profits, the industry tends to focus on drugs to treat chronic
conditions that affect many people, often making minor,
patentable variations to existing drugs with no added thera-
peutic value, which, however, is rarely a hindrance to sell-
ing them in large volumes at prices that can be 10 or 20
times more expensive than off-patent drugs.2,12 To achieve
this, the industry spends much more on marketing than on
research and development.2
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The current system provides little incentives to study
and develop less expensive nondrug interventions, although
they may often be preferable. Some of our largest expendi-
tures are for drugs to treat type 2 diabetes, hypertension
and high cholesterol, which are largely attributable to poor
diet and lack of exercise. Worthwhile interventions might
include stricter regulations of food and soft drinks, subsi-
dized school lunches and courses in the preparation of
healthy, affordable meals that can make people lose weight
so that they no longer need drugs.19-21 Another example is
the high and increasing usage of psychiatric drugs, which
has been accompanied by an increase in disability pensions
in all countries where this relationship has been investi-
gated.22 In most situations, psychotherapy should be the
preferred option,12 and in contrast to drugs, it reduces the
risk of suicide.23
The industry’s justification for patents and high drug
prices is that patents are needed to recoup the high costs of
drug development and thus ensure a needed supply of new
drugs. Around 15 years ago, the industry narrative put the
cost of developing a new drug at about US $1 billion,18,24
while independent analysts arrived at a figure that was 10%
of this.25 Currently, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases ini-
tiative (DNDi) estimates that it can develop a new drug for
between $110 million and $170 million, which includes a
theoretical cost of failed projects.26 In reality, the prices of
drugs do not reflect research and development costs but
what heavily subsidized “markets” are willing to pay.
3 | COUNTERING MYTHS ABOUT
DRUG REGULATION
In recent years, drug agencies have gradually relaxed their
standards for approval and drug companies pay a fee,
which gives them leverage in the regulatory system.27 The
drug industry contributes 83% of the entire budget for the
European Medicines Agency (EMA)28 although nobody
receiving 83% of a salary from industry would be admitted
to any drug evaluation committee. With less rigorous regu-
latory standards, more drugs have been withdrawn from the
market or have received serious safety warnings.29-33
The regulatory requirements are particularly low in can-
cer, and many hugely expensive cancer drugs have been
approved without the existence of a single randomized
trial34,35 and with only surrogate outcomes, for example
disease-free survival instead of longer life. New cancer
drugs are generally no better than existing ones2 or increase
survival by 1 or 2 months only.36,37
The standards for approval continue to fall, most
recently illustrated by the EMA’s introduction of adaptive
pathways, which will allow drugs to be approved based on
observational data only.38 Some patient groups support the
industry’s demands for faster approvals that will give them
rapid access to the latest drugs. However, it is a myth that
the current system benefits patients, and as most patient
advocacy groups accept drug company funding, they gener-
ally cannot speak publicly on behalf of patients about regu-
latory issues.39,40
4 | DRUG RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT AS A PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE
A radically new approach is needed to stimulate innovation
in the public interest and to reduce drug expenditure sub-
stantially. Marketing is not needed to persuade doctors to
use good medicines and the patient-focused system I pro-
pose will prohibit industry strategies for disseminating mis-
leading drug information such as industry-sponsored
education of doctors and patient groups, detailing of doc-
tors, drug ads (including those in medical journals for pre-
scription drugs) and seeding trials of no scientific value.2
A European Institute of Public Health could have the
overall responsibility for developing drugs and bringing
them to the market, in collaboration with a network of
institutions, which could themselves develop drugs or con-
tribute to the various parts of drug development. Excellent
examples of nonprofit institutes that have proved highly
useful include the Mario Negri Institute,41 the DNDi and
Institut Pasteur. A public institute developed along these
lines would have a transparent governance structure that is
accountable to the people and would hold regular priority
discussions, with public participation. For-profit companies
could bid for contracts to contribute expertise and deliver
specialized services, such as animal studies or drug manu-
facture.
Substantial funds will be needed initially, in the transi-
tion phase to the new system, to develop the necessary
public infrastructure and to pay for public drug develop-
ment. Several models already exist, one of which is taxa-
tion. The Italian drug agency requires drug companies to
contribute 5% of their promotional expenses, apart from
salaries, which has created a large fund used partly for
independent clinical research,42,43 and Spain has a similar
initiative.43 A tax on sales would create a much greater
income but most importantly, the new system will avoid
the huge waste we currently have. It has been estimated
that the savings in the new system will be 5-10 times
greater than the amount the drug industry currently spends
on research and development.13 Vastly more public money
is therefore being poured into the current system than what
will be needed in future.
To stimulate innovation, inventors could be awarded a
“finder’s fee,” for example 10% of the potential savings for
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1 year. Such innovations need not be limited to new inter-
ventions but could be studies that demonstrate that a cur-
rently used diagnostic test, intervention, dose or treatment
length is no better than a cheaper one—a kind of study the
industry has no interest in carrying out.
In the not-for-profit model, the price of drugs will be
set low enough—using the manufacturing cost plus a small
margin—that also third-world countries could afford to buy
the drugs. This would improve the health of their citizens
and increase international trade and prosperity.
5 | THE TRANSITION TOWARDS
THE NEW SYSTEM
Some of the necessary changes can be introduced quickly;
for others, a transition phase is needed that includes legisla-
tion, public education and research on needs.
5.1 | Patents, patent laws and trade
agreements
Once fully implemented, the new system will abolish the
patenting of drugs and devices. In the transition period, all
regulations that impede the introduction of generic medici-
nes and biosimilars to the market should be removed, and
new patents for minor changes, for example the removal of
the inactive part in a stereoisomer, should not be allowed.
The bar for launching lawsuits against generic competitors
with claims that they have broken a patent should be raised
substantially, and the time limits for lawsuits and patent
exclusivity shortened. Companies that launch frivolous law-
suits should be subject to stiff penalties, as the mere threat
of such lawsuits often stifles innovation in start-up compa-
nies.13
In the transition period towards public drug develop-
ment, compulsory licensing and government use of patents
can ensure the availability of life-saving drugs and drugs
that may prevent serious disability. These mechanisms,
which are available under international law but underused,
allow a third party (eg a generic company or government-
owned facility) to produce cheaper copies of a drug, in
return for a small fee to the patent holder. This interim
measure would allow competition right from the start.
International trade agreements that emphasize secrecy
and commercial confidentiality are a real threat to what I
propose. Our politicians will therefore need to ensure that
such agreements do not become obstacles for improve-
ments in public health, equity and savings in our national
economies. Existing agreements such as TRIPS (trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights) will need to
be revamped.
5.2 | De-linking, prizes and pricing
In the transition phase, when drug companies still have
new drugs under development, they could be offered a
buyout of their patent, like a prize, commensurate with the
benefits and harms of the drug, as documented in publicly
conducted trials with relevant comparators and outcomes.
The use of a prize system is consistent with proposals in
the WHO Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (GSPoA) of
May 2008, and the EU Council Conclusions on Global
Health in May 2010. Both called for needs-driven innova-
tion and for further exploration of innovation models that
de-link the postulated cost of research and development
from the price of medicines.44 Similar thoughts were
expressed in the US Senate Bill 1137.24
Countries should collaborate on price negotiations with
companies and use their powers to refuse to reimburse too
expensive drugs and to impose pricing practices that take
into account the public research investments and the fact
that pharmaceuticals are public goods (as opposed to the
currently promoted value-based pricing approach, which
puts a monetary value on life).
5.3 | Public education and research on needs
To engage the public in the profound change to the new
system, a programme of education and myth busting will
be undertaken to combat the widespread erroneous beliefs
that sustain the current system.
Important educational initiatives already exist to help
the public think critically about the harms of inappropriate
and excessive drug use and to recognize the many nondrug
strategies for preventing disease and improving health.45,46
These programmes have gained support among public
health advocates internationally; they can be expanded and
adapted, raising public awareness about the enormous inef-
ficiencies that make the current system financially and
morally unsustainable.
Like any drug development endeavour, the new system
will have to manage the risk of aborted projects. Taxpayers
may view such failures as a poor use of their money unless
they understand the realities of scientific research, includ-
ing the rarity of research breakthroughs. Continuous educa-
tion of the public and the politicians, with trustworthy and
transparent figures for the costs of research and develop-
ment, will be needed.
To move from a supply- and profit-driven to a demand-
driven system, the needs of patients and of society will be
identified, taking into account epidemiological data, public
expenditures, mortality statistics and patient-relevant out-
comes.47
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5.4 | Needed changes at the European
Medicines Agency and other drug agencies
In the new system, drug agencies are fully publicly funded
and have much more focus on drug harms. Trials submitted
for obtaining marketing authorization should be large
enough and run for sufficient lengths of time to capture
rare but lethal harms, particularly because promises of post-
marketing studies are often not fulfilled.42,48
The most critical change to be adopted is to request the
demonstration of a minimal clinically relevant effect by
meeting criteria established in advance. This effect should
be shown in independent trials in the appropriate patient
population with full transparency on methodology and
results, and taking into account all studies—not just those
that showed benefit, which is the current regulatory stan-
dard. Current efficacy standards allow drugs to come on
the market based on effects that are not clinically meaning-
ful. The effect of newer antipsychotic drugs and antidepres-
sants, for example, fall considerably below the threshold
psychiatrists have established for minimal clinical rele-
vance.12
Drugs should not be approved based on surrogate out-
comes (eg blood glucose rather than complications to dia-
betes) except when they are validated to correlate with
patient-relevant outcomes, which is very rarely the case.49-
51 Noninferiority and equivalence trials are also usually
misleading52-54 and should rarely be accepted. The norm
should be to establish benefit in superiority trials compared
to the best available interventions.
A new, well-funded section completely separate and
independent from the section that approves drugs should be
established to make decisions about drug withdrawal for
safety reasons.
5.5 | Improving clinical trials
Clinical trials of drugs and devices will be performed inde-
pendently from the industry by nonprofit public health-
focused institutions, which will prepare the protocol, conduct
and monitor the trials, and ensure that no one involved with
the trials has conflict of interests in relation to drug compa-
nies. Additional safeguards, such as blinding data analysis
and writing of manuscripts, will be put in place.55
Publicly conducted drug trials will ensure that new
drugs are being compared with old cheap drugs in a fair
manner and also with nondrug interventions. They will also
be vastly cheaper than drug industry-conducted trials. The
European Society of Cardiology has estimated that
university centres can perform drug trials for about
one-tenth to one-twentieth the cost of industry trials where
there are numerous for-profit middlemen who tack a hefty
surcharge.56
To improve the usefulness of trials for patients, draft
trial protocols will be publicly available on a website to
allow patients and others to comment on them. All infor-
mation related to the trials will be publicly accessible, from
the preplanned outcomes to the raw, anonymized patient
data, allowing others to conduct their own analyses. The
trial reports will be published in open-access journals or on
the web so that everyone, including the patients who vol-
unteered for the trials, can access them without charge. Pre-
clinical studies (eg animal toxicology studies), including
the raw data, will also be made available.
5.6 | Creating attractive job positions in the
new system
Politicians often see the drug industry as a motor for eco-
nomic growth that contributes to job opportunities, trade
balance and the knowledge economy, a perception that
the industry promotes. In 2013, according to the Euro-
pean pharmaceutical industry association, the industry
directly employed more than 690,000 people in Europe
and generated three to four times more jobs indirectly.57
However, many of these jobs are in sales and legal
departments, and ultimately paid for by all of us through
high drug prices, and the intensive marketing causes
many unnecessary deaths and is harmful to our national
economies.
Many people working in the pharmaceutical industry
have invaluable expertise, which they might prefer to use
in a nonprofit environment. Psychological research has
shown that inventing or contributing to something that is
genuinely helpful to people can be a very strong motivator.
Therefore, there will be no lack of incentives for useful
innovations. In fact, it seems that high-risk, bold invest-
ments that led to technological revolutions were sparked by
public sector institutions.58
In the beginning, there may be a scarcity of publicly
employed researchers with the detailed know-how about
conducting such tasks as long-term animal toxicology stud-
ies and randomized trials that meet the standards for drug
approval. Training programmes can be developed to teach
people the necessary skills.
I acknowledge that this vision of a better future requires
much discussion and political will but also expect that
details of the necessary new structures will be agreed upon
over time, as we have no other choice than to change the
current system radically.
CONTRIBUTORS AND SOURCES
This paper is the result of my participation in a consultative
and deliberative process, initiated by the Belgian Health
Care Knowledge Centre and the Dutch Health Care
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Institute, to explore, in an unfettered way, potential solu-
tions to the complex societal challenge of high drug prices
and medical innovation. The project had the ambition to
elaborate creative scenarios and to explore novel, more sus-
tainable ways to ensure patient access to safe and effective
drugs, while maintaining strong incentives for innovation
and focusing on real health needs. The project benefited
from the contribution of a carefully selected group of 30
experts and stakeholders from Europe and North America,
including patient representatives, industry leaders, aca-
demics, regulators, payers and government representatives.
Based on in-depth interviews of these experts, followed by
two two-day workshops in Amsterdam in March and April
2016, four coherent scenarios were developed.59,60 These
scenarios were presented to a wider audience in the context
of the Dutch EU presidency in June 2016. I encourage
politicians, researchers, patients and other citizens to sup-
port the suggestions I have presented here, which provide
the most radical of the four scenarios. I invite debate about
this proposal, assessing its merits in relation to other possi-
ble change scenarios. I coined the idea of a future without
patents and with public development of drugs. I am experi-
enced in the areas of clinical trials and public health and I
am a guarantor.
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